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Act 91 of the Education Empowerment Act, Which
Provides for Mayoral Control of Failing School
Districts in Select Urban Areas, Does Not Violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution or the Prohibition of Special Laws
Under Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution: Harrisburg School District v. Zogby
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE -
PROHIBITION OF SPECIAL LAWS - EDUCATION EMPOWERMENT ACT
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Act 91 of the Educa-
tion Empowerment Act, which provides for mayoral control of fail-
ing school districts in select urban areas, does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or the
prohibition of special laws under Article III, Section 32 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, because the legislature had a rational
basis for the classification and the class had the potential of con-
taining more than one member.
Harrisburg School District v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079 (Pa. 2003).
Pennsylvania's Education Empowerment Act (hereinafter
"EEA") permits the mayor to take control of failing school districts
in medium-sized cities. The EEA requires the Department of
Education to place a school with a history of low test scores on the
Education Empowerment List (hereinafter "List").2  The place-
ment of a school district on the List is the initial step in a three
1. Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby, 828 A.2d 1079 (Pa. 2003). The Education Empow-
erment Act is an amendment to the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, P.L. 30,
1949, as added by the Act of May 10, P.L. 44, 2000, 24 P.S. §§ 17-1701-B-17-1716-B. Har-
risburg v. Zogby, 789 A.2d 797 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (en banc).
2. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1081. The test used for list qualification is the Pennsylvania
System of State Assessment (PSSA). Harrisburg v. Hickok (Hickok II), 781 A.2d 221 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000). Once a school has been placed on the List, the district must name an
.empowerment team" to work with the Department of Education to develop an improve-
ment plan. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1081. "In implementing the plan, the school board may,
inter alia, replace district administrative personnel (including the superintendent), estab-
lish charter school or privately-run schools, and reallocate resources within the district." Id.
The district must file annual reports about the implementation plan with the Department.
Id. Once the district demonstrates improvement and reaches the goals of the implementa-
tion plan, the Department will remove it from the list. Id. at 1082.
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year recovery plan.3 However, some urban school districts that
fall within certain criterion will bypass the List and be subjected
to an expedited plan.4 In these districts, the mayor of the city in
which the district resides will appoint a board of control to replace
the existing school board.5 The mayor will also name an empow-
erment team to develop a recovery plan for the district, which
must be submitted to the Department of Education for modifica-
tion and approval.6 A district that has been subjected to mayoral
control will remain under the mayor's authority for at least five
7
years.
The potential class of districts for mayoral control was expanded
by the EEA's Act 91 Amendment, which was passed in the Penn-
sylvania legislature in 2000.8 Originally, the highly specialized
criterion listed in Act 16 of the EEA only included the Harrisburg
school district as a potential member of the class.9 In Harrisburg
v. Hickok (Hickok I), Harrisburg School District had brought an
3. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1082. If the district fails to achieve the goals of the implementa-
tion plan within three years, the Department will certify the district as an "education em-
powerment district" and will set up a board of three members to control the district. Id. at
1081-82. The board will be comprised of the Secretary of Education or his appointee and
two residents from the district's county. Id. Once test scores improve and the goals of the
plan are met, the local school board will reassume control of the district. Id. at 1082.
4. Id. Act 91 defines which districts will be subjected to the expedited plan. Id. at
1083. See infra note 9 for the legislative history of Act 16, Act 91's predecessor.
5. Id. at 1082. The board will consist of five members, chosen solely at the mayor's
discretion. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. After five years, if a district has improved the failing test scores and met the
goals of the implementation plan, control will be returned to the local school board. Id.
8. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1083.
9. Id. at 1083. Act 16 defined a potential school district for mayoral control as "a
school district of the second class with a history of low test performance which is cotermi-
nous with the city of the third class which contains the permanent seat of government." 24
PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1707-B (2000); Harrisburg v. Hickok (Hickok II), 781 A.2d 221 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2001). Act 16 is commonly referred to as the Reed Amendment, named after
the Harrisburg Mayor, Stephen Reed. Hickok II, 781 A.2d at 224. Act 16 originated as
Senate Bill 652 (SB652), entitled "An Act Amending the Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30"
(the Public School Code of 1949, 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1-101-27-2703). Harrisburg v.
Hickok (Hickok I), 762 A.2d 398, 400 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). Despite the title, the original
bill only proposed one new section and one amendment to the School Code. Hickok 1, 762
A.2d at 400-01. Following two rounds of amendments, not relevant to the present case, the
bill was passed by the House of Representatives on June 16, 1999. Id. at 401. The Bill was
returned to the Senate, then referred to the Committee on Rules and Executive Nomina-
tions. Id. Bill 653 was passed in the Senate on May 2, 2000, after receiving further
amendments from the Senate Rules Committee. Id. Back in the House, the Bill was re-
ferred to the House Rules Committee, where substantial new material was added, includ-
ing the new article to the School Code entitled the "Education Empowerment Act" (EEA).
Id. On May 3, 2000, Bill 652 was passed in the House, and the Senate concurred. Id. The
governor signed the bill on May 10, 2000. Id.
Harrisburg Sch. Dist. v. Zogby
action, similar to the present case, challenging the constitutional-
ity of Act 16.10 The Commonwealth Court had granted the school
district's request for a preliminary injunction, and the Supreme
Court affirmed." One week before the Supreme Court released
their opinion, the General Assembly amended Act 16 in an appar-
ent response to the Commonwealth Court's order. 2 Act 91 embod-
ies the amended Act 16.13
Act 91 defines the class of potential districts for mayoral control
more broadly than its predecessor, Act 16.'4 Four districts in the
Commonwealth have the potential for mayoral control: Harris-
burg, Erie, Allentown, and Reading."
In December 2000, the Harrisburg School District, Harrisburg
School Board, and individual petitioners filed a complaint seeking
to have Act 91 (the amended Act 16) declared unconstitutional.16
The action, Harrisburg v. Hickok (Hickok II), was a petition for
review in the form of a complaint in equity, which sought a de-
claratory judgment and named the Secretary of Education, the
Mayor of Harrisburg, and potential members of the mayor-
appointed board as defendants." The case name was later
amended to Harrisburg v. Zogby, reflecting Secretary of Education
Eugene Hickok's replacement, Charles B. Zogby. 5 The complaint
alleged the following: first, Act 91 violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution; second, Act 91 violated
the prohibition of special laws contained in Article III, Section 32
of the Pennsylvania Constitution; third, Act 91 improperly
changed the form of Harrisburg's government; fourth, Act 91
impermissibly granted the mayor-appointed board taxing power;
and finally, Act 91 unconstitutionally removed the functioning
10. Harrisburg v. Hickok (Hickok I), 761 A.2d 1132 (Pa. 2000). See infra notes 121-128
and accompanying text.
11. Hickok 1, 761 A.2d at 1136.
12. Zogby, 828 A-2d at 1083.
13. Id. at 1086.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1084. 24 P.S. § 17-1707-B(a.1.). The Act defines a district that is eligible for
mayoral control as "a school district of the second class which has a history of extraordinar-
ily low test performance, which is coterminous with a city of the third class that has opted
under the 'Optional Third Class City Charter Law' or 53 Pa.C.S. Pt. III Subpt. E to be gov-
erned by a mayor-council form of government and which has a population in excess of forty-
five thousand (45,000)..." Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1083.
16. Id.
17. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1083-84. The plaintiffs also requested a preliminary injunction,
which the trial court denied. Id. at 1084. The Harrisburg School District withdrew from
the case in December of 2001. Id. at 1084 n.6.
18. Id. at 1084 n.7.
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school board. 9 The public officials filed preliminary objections to
all five counts; the Commonwealth Court overruled the objections
on Counts I, II, and III, but it sustained the objections as to
Counts IV and V.2"
The Commonwealth Court found Act 91 to be unconstitutional,
holding that no real distinctions were apparent for the creation of
the class. 21  The defendant public officials argued that the classi-
fication was a rational one, reasonably related to a state objective,
because the classification was based on test scores.22 Harrisburg
responded that no rational reason could exist for the classification
since the General Assembly had created the class in such a narrow
fashion.2 Judge Pelligrini, writing for the majority, stated that in
order for the public officials to prevail, the class must not be closed
and must be based on genuine distinctions. The Commonwealth
Court stated:
The number and oddness of the distinctions that mix and
match a class of school with a particular subclass of a third
class city that itself is a particular subclass of a home rule
municipality that is further narrowed by a population classifi-
cation that itself is a subclass of a population classification
used to determine classes of city indicates that the object of
the legislation was to winnow down the number of school dis-
tricts so that it would apply to a very, very, very small num-
ber. While that, in and of itself, does not make the legislation
violative of Article III, Section 32's prohibition against special
legislation, the absence of any apparent 'rhyme or reason' for
the factors used indicates that they were artificial and irrele-
vant to remedying the situation in districts with 'extraordi-
narily low [test] scores.' 5
Additionally, the Commonwealth Court could not comprehend
why only the narrow class of Harrisburg would be the sole district
requiring expedited mayoral control, "when the situation would be
19. Hickok II, 781 A.2d at 224.
20. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1084. As to Counts IV & V, the Commonwealth Court held that
the school board retained their tax-levying power and offices even though their powers had
been affected. Id.
21. Hickok II, 781 A.2d at 230.
22. Id. at 226.
23. Id. at 227.
24. Id. at 227-28.
25. Id. at 228.
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just as grave for all students in all extraordinarily failing districts
to warrant an immediate takeover."26 Moreover, the court held
that a label of "pilot program" could not be used to circumvent Ar-
ticle III, Section 32's prohibition against special laws.27
Judge Leadbetter filed a dissenting opinion, stating that he
found no denial of equal protection principles or violation of Penn-
sylvania's Constitution by Act 91.26 He opined that the General
Assembly had enacted the EEA in response to the growing prob-
lem of failing districts throughout the Commonwealth. 29  Fur-
thermore, the dissenting opinion declared that Act 91 provided "a
specialized remedy" for Harrisburg, which was "specifically tai-
lored both to the educational problems of the district and to the
particular form of government of the City and the district."0 De-
claring Act 91 to be a pilot program modeled after promising pro-
grams in other states, Judge Leadbetter believed the act was a
rational legislative response to failure in the Commonwealth's
education program."
Subsequently, Harrisburg School District moved for judgment
on the pleadings on the remaining Counts I, II, and III.2 The
Commonwealth Court granted the motion, and the defendants
appealed.33
On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Commonwealth Court.34 The court considered
whether Act 91 of the EEA violated either the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution or the prohibition of spe-
cial laws under the Pennsylvania Constitution and whether Act 91
improperly changed the form of Harrisburg's government.35 The
26. Hickok II, 781 A.2d at 228.
27. Id. at 229.
28. Id. at 239 (Leadbetter, J., dissenting). Judge Kelley also filed an opinion, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 236 (Kelley, J, concurring in part, dissenting in
part). However, her dissent only addressed the taxation issues of Count IV and V which
were not considered in Harrisburg v. Zogby, which were not considered on appeal to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Id.
29. Id. at 239 (Leadbetter, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Leadbetter, J., dissenting).
31. Hickok II, 781 A.2d at 239 (Leadbetter, J., dissenting).
32. Harrisburg v. Zogby, 789 A.2d 797 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
33. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1081.
34. Id. at 1093.
35. Id. The direct appeal was taken pursuant to 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 723(a) which
provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final
orders of the Commonwealth Court entered in any matter which was originally commenced
in the Commonwealth Court except an order entered in a matter which constitutes an
Spring 2004 629
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majority found that the class created by Act 91 was not "based
upon artificial or irrelevant distinctions utilized merely to evade
the constitutional prohibition on special legislation," but rather
was "a classification which is reasonably related to the Common-
wealth's legitimate interest in, and the General Assembly's consti-
tutional duty to ensure, the existence of a thorough and efficient
system of public education."36 Thus, the court held that Act 91 did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Con-
stitution or Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion.37 Additionally, the court held that Act 91 did not change the
form of Harrisburg's government, and therefore was not in viola-
tion of Article IX, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.38
Before addressing the specific issues on appeal, Justice Saylor,
writing for the majority, examined the similar purposes served by
the Equal Protection Clause and Article III, Section 32 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution.39 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has held that the purpose of both constitutional provisions is to
"reflect the principle that like persons in like circumstances must
be treated similarly." ° The court acknowledged that Section 32
has been understood to include the principles of equal protection.4
Thus, the court concluded that the provisions were sufficiently
appeal to the Commonwealth Court from another court, a district justice or another gov-
ernment unit." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 723(a) (1978).
36. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1091 (internal citations omitted). See also Hickok I, which held
that if a legislature has real and relevant purposes for the distinctions used to create a
class, the class will be upheld. Hickok 1, 761 A.2d at 1136.
37. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1091.
38. Id. at 1093.
39. Id. at 1088-89.
40. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1088 (citing DeFazio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Allegheny County,
756 A.2d 1103, 1105-06 (Pa. 2000)).
41. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1088. See also Tool Sales & Serv. Co. v. Commonwealth 637
A.2d 607 (Pa. 1993) (holding that the analysis to be applied in determining the reasonable-
ness of classifications under art. III, § 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution are the same). But see Robert F. Wil-
liams, Continuing Developments in State Constitutional Law, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 573 (2001),
for a discussion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's treatment of equality concerns under
the Pennsylvania Constitution as identical to federal Equal Protection issues even though
each equality provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution is different from the federal Equal
Protection Clause in text, history, and meaning. Id. at 576. In addition to Art. III, § 32,
Art. I, § I ("All men are born equally free and independent.. ."); Art. I, § 26 ("neither the
Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoy-
ment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil
right."); and Art. VIII, § 1 ("All taxes shall be uniform . . .") are also interpreted by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court as though they were identical to the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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similar as to warrant simultaneous analysis for both constitu-
tional issues.42
The court first considered whether the Act 91 criterion, which
limits the potential schools for mayoral control to only four dis-
tricts, constituted a special law.43 The court reasoned that the
prohibition against special laws had been included in the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution to prevent privileged legislation for specific
locales." The majority stated that the "underlying purpose of Sec-
tion 32's prohibition on special legislation was not so much to pro-
hibit the General Assembly from undertaking limited, remedial
measures as part of a long-term strategy to fulfill its duties con-
nected with the public interest but [rather] to end the practice of
favoritism." Additionally, the court acknowledged that equal
protection principles do not vitiate the Legislature's power to clas-
sify, even if that classification seems discriminatory on its face."
The court stated that differential treatment of persons with differ-
ing needs will not be found unconstitutional as long as the differ-
ential treatment has a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
state purpose.47 The majority recognized that a reviewing court
has the latitude to hypothesize the legislative purpose for the dif-
ferential treatment when determining whether the differential
41treatment is reasonably related to a state purpose.
Applying this rationale to the facts of the present case, Justice
Saylor noted that the General Assembly was permitted to classify
school districts and cities based on population because legislation
based on such a classification was deemed to be general, not spe-
cial.49 The court found the General Assembly limitation of the
class to a few cities, which had all chosen a mayor-council form of
government under the Charter Law, to be reasonable." The class
had additionally been limited to cities in which the mayor would
42. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1088. See also DeFazio, 756 A.2d at 1105 (holding that "the
underlying purpose of [PA. CONST. art III, § 32] is analogous to the Equal Protection Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, and the analysis and interpretation of the clause should be guided
by the same principles that apply in interpretation of federal equal protection).
43. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1087-88.
44. Id. "In the seven years before the Constitution of 1874 was adopted the General
Assembly enacted 8,755 local or special acts and only 475 general laws." ROBERT E.
WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321 (1985).
45. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1088.
46. Id. at 1088-89
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1089.
49. Id. at 1089-90.
50. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1090.
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share the local electorate with the school board.51 The court stated
that this condition had the "benefit of providing the individual
who retains ultimate authority over the board of control (i.e., the
mayor) with the greatest political incentive to ensure that effec-
tive means are implemented to improve the performance of the
school district involved." 2 Additionally, Justice Saylor presumed
that the General Assembly most likely desired to limit the mayor
pilot program to a few districts until it became more apparent that
the expedited mayor control board would be effective.53 Further-
more, the court stated that the Legislature was free to ratify social
programs incrementally until the program's success was docu-
mented. 4 Thus, the court concluded that Act 91 could not be clas-
sified as special legislation; therefore, it was not in violation of
equal protection principles."
Next, the court considered whether Act 91 improperly expanded
the power of Harrisburg's mayor absent the approval of the Har-
risburg voters." The Charter Law specifically grants the mayor
power to enforce "all general laws applicable thereto."57 The ma-
jority reasoned that any city that adopts a mayor-council form of
government under Charter Law is endorsing not only local ordi-
nances, but also general laws enacted by the General Assembly."
Additionally, Justice Saylor wrote that the powers granted to the
mayor under the Charter Law were not an exhaustive list of may-




54. Id. at 1091.
55. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1091.
56. Id. Harrisburg has adopted a Charter Law as permitted under Art. IX, § 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. Art. IX, § 3 provides that:
Municipalities shall have the right and power to adopt optional forms of government
as provided by law. The General Assembly shall provide optional forms of govern-
ment for all municipalities. An optional form of government shall be presented to the
electors by initiative, by the governing body of the municipality, or by the General
Assembly. Adoption or repeal of an optional form of government shall be by referen-
dum.
PA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
57. 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 41412 (1957).
58. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1092.
59. Id. at 1092-93. The Charter Law provides for mayoral duties and powers such as:
size of city council, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 41213 (1957); manner in which city officials are
elected, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 41241 (1957); length of term, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §
41403 (1957); manner in which vacancies are filled, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 41406 (1957),
manner in which local ordinances are enacted, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 41413 (1957);
whether and how a department or administrator is established, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. §
41416 (1957); and preparation of city budget, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 41418 (1957).
632 Vol. 42
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held that Act 91 did not change Harrisburg's form of government;
therefore, it was not in violation of Article IX, Section 3 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. °
In his dissent, Justice Lamb stated that Act 91 did constitute
special legislation.6 1 He suggested that Act 91 was "nothing more
that a thinly veiled attempt by the Legislature to promulgate spe-
cial legislation under the guise of a general law." 2 Justice Lamb
believed the General Assembly could have corrected low perform-
ance in urban school districts through the passage of general laws,
and furthermore, if the remediation of failing schools had been the
legitimate purpose of the Legislature, it would not have passed
Act 91.3 Based on his belief that Act 91 was a special law as pro-
hibited by the Pennsylvania Constitution, Justice Lamb did not
join the majority.'
Encompassed in Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution is the prohibition against special laws, declaring that
"[tlhe General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any
case which has been or can be provided for by general law and
specifically the General Assembly shall not pass any local or spe-
cial law ... [r]egulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships,
wards, boroughs, or school districts. . ." Special laws permit ar-
bitrary, favorable treatment of certain groups or regions; in this
context, diversity is considered to promote inequality, thus it is
rejected." Notwithstanding the long line of cases holding that Ar-
ticle III, Section 32 and the Fourteenth Amendment warrant the
60. Zogby, 828 A.2d at 1093.
61. Id. at 1093 (Lamb, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Lamb, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Lamb, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Lamb, J., dissenting).
65. PA. CONST. art. III, § 32. The full text of§ 32 reads as follows:
The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been
or can be provided for by general law and specifically the General Assembly shall not
pass any local or special law; 1. Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships,
wards, boroughs, or school districts; 2. Vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys; 3.
Locating or changing county seats, erecting new counties or changing county lines; 4.
Erecting new townships or boroughs, changing township lines, borough limits or
school districts; 5. Remitting fines, penalties and forfeitures, or refunding moneys le-
gally paid into the treasury; 6. Exempting property from taxation; 7. Regulating la-
bor, trade, mining or manufacturing; 8. Creating corporations or amending, renewing
or extending the charters therof; Nor shall the General Assembly indirectly enact any
special or local law by the partial repeal of a general law; but laws repealing local or
special acts may be passed.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 32.
66. Donald Marritz, Making Equality Matter (Again): The Prohibition Against Special
Laws in the Pennsylavania Constitution, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 161, 167 (1993).
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same analysis because the purposes of the two clauses are suffi-
ciently similar, Pennsylvania's proscription of special laws bans a
different type of discrimination than that of the federal Equal Pro-
tection Clause.67 Pennsylvania's prohibition of special laws pre-
vents discrimination against a locality, whereas the federal Equal
Protection Clause prevents discrimination against a person or
group.
68
Article III, Section 7 (presently Article III, Section 32) was
adopted in 1873, "to put an end to the flood of privileged legisla-
tion for particular localities and for private purposes which [were]
common in 1873. '9 Instead of providing for the general health
and welfare of the people of the Commonwealth, the General As-
sembly regularly succumbed to the powerful private and economic
interests.7 ' Lobbyists for business and industry often controlled
the agenda of the legislature; the result was scant attention for
general legislation. The purpose of Article III, Section 7 was to
prohibit these laws that were deemed local and special 2
In 1875, Article III, Section 7 first came before the court in
Wheeler v. Philadelphia.3 In 1874, the General Assembly had
passed the first comprehensive classification law for cities in the
Commonwealth. 4 The legislation in Wheeler divided the cities
into three classes according to their size and proscribed laws re-
lated to the comprehensive classification.75 Under this classifica-
tion, Philadelphia was the only city named to the first class; ac-
cordingly, action was brought attacking this law as local and spe-
cial.76 The court held that Article III, Section 7 was not intended
to prevent the legislature from meeting different needs, and, to aid
67. See Laudenberger v. Port Auth. Of Allegheny County, 436 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa. 1981);
cf Harristown Dev. Corp. v. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 614 A.2d 1128, 1131 (Pa. 1992) (holding
that same analysis of state and federal clauses is warranted). But see Marritz, supra note
66, at 167 (arguing that provisions are similar but differences in origin, focus, and text are
critical in the analysis).
68. See Marritz, supra note 66, at 167.
69. Haverford Township v. Siegle 28 A.2d 786, 788 (Pa. 1942). Art. III, § 7 was renum-
bered to art. III, § 32 on May 16, 1967. See Marritz, supra note 66, at 161 n.146. Art. III, §
7 enumerated twenty-seven substantive areas where special laws were prohibited; Art. III,
§ 32 preserves eight of the original areas. Id. For the full text of art. III, § 32, see supra
note 65.
70. See Marritz, supra note 66, at 186-87.
71. Id. at 188.
72. Haverford Township v. Siegle, 28 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1942).
73. 77 Pa. 338 (1875).
74. Wheeler, 77 Pa. at 342.
75. Id. at 341.
76. Id.
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in meeting those needs, classification was not excluded.77 Al-
though Philadelphia was presently the only member of the first
class, the class was still open to other potential members as the
population of other cities in the Commonwealth grew.78 The court
in Wheeler rationalized that it would be absurd to impose the
same regulations of a large port city on smaller cities with barely
more than a stream running through them.79
Nearly seventy years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
built upon the Wheeler rationale in Haverford Township v. Siegle,
holding that the Legislature has the right to exclude certain mem-
bers of a class from legislation, when the statute would be of no
use.8" The court held that a distinction may be made among town-
ships, even though all the townships in question were members of
the same population class, if the distinction was based on need
and useful application." The legislation in question in Haverford,
the Act of June 5, 1941, P.L. 84, imposed regulations on appoint-
ment, promotion, reduction in rank, suspension, and removal of
members of the police force in first class townships.82 However,
under the Act, the class of townships that would be subjected to
the regulations of the Act was limited to first class townships hav-
ing three or more paid police officers.83 The Township of Haver-
ford argued that the Act was a violation of Article III, Section 7
because the classification was based on the number of paid po-
licemen in the township as well as the population of the town-
ship.'
Haverford further argued that for a classification to be lawful, it
had to be based solely on population.85 The court rejected the ar-
gument that the only appropriate criterion for a class was popula-
tion, and held that the legislature had the right, while regulating
a particular class, "to exclude certain members of the class to
77. Id. at 349-50.
78. Id. at 350.
79. Wheeler, 77 Pa. at 350.
80. 28 A.2d 786 (Pa. 1942).
81. Haverford, 28 A.2d at 786.
82. Id. at 787. The legislation before the court was the Act of June 5, 1941, P.L. 84, 53
PA. CONS. STAT. § 351.1 (1957). Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Petitioner Haverford Township based their argument on PA. CONST. art. III, §
34, which expressly grants the legislature power to classify according to population. Id. at
789-90. However, the court held that the grant to classify according to population does not
exclude the right to classify by another method. Id. at 790.
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whom the Act can have no useful application.""s The court further
stated, "[a] township having one or two or no police officers would
be justified in objecting strenuously to the expense and inconven-
ience of maintaining a complete system of police civil service
which would have no function to perform."87 The Act was upheld
on the grounds that the exclusion of townships with fewer than
three officers from the regulation was both reasonable and neces-
88sary.
In 1978, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that classifica-
tion is a question for the legislature, and subject only to judicial
review to the extent required for the court to make a determina-
tion as to whether the classification is founded on real distinc-
tions, as opposed to artificial or irrelevant distinctions used only to
avoid constitutional mandates. 9 In Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Arm-
strong Cork Co., Freezer Storage, the plaintiff, contended that the
Act of December 22, 1965, P.L. 1183 (hereinafter "Statute") cre-
ated an unlawful distinction between engineers, architects, build-
ers and building contractors (hereinafter, collectively called
"builders") and others involved with land improvement such as
landowners and suppliers, to whom the statute did not apply.9"
The Statute limited the builder's liability for an injury arising
from a building improvement to twelve years after the completion
of the project.91
The court found that the inquiry before them was whether there
were "real distinctions between builders and landowners, and be-
tween builders and suppliers" that would justify the time limita-
tion placed on the builders' liability.92 Noting that it was rational
to adjust length of time for liability in proportion to the size of the
class of potential plaintiffs, the court theorized several reasons the
Legislature could have limited the liability of builders to twelve
93years.
86. Haverford, 28 A.2d at 788.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715 (Pa. 1978).
90. Freezer Storage, 382 A-2d at 718.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Among the potential reasons the court listed for the legislature's distinction of
builders were: 1) builders have a larger class of potential plaintiffs than that of landowners
or suppliers; 2) builders may be liable under several different legal theories-contract,
warranty, negligence, strict liability in tort; 3) builders have no control over maintenance of
the improvement once the construction is completed; 4) builders' insurance differs from
landowners' insurance in both structure and pricing. Id.
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The court, while upholding the statute, held that the actual in-
tent of the Legislature was irrelevant if any reason could be hy-
pothesized by the court to create a rational basis for the Legisla-
ture's distinction.94 In reaching this holding, the majority relied
on several cases that had addressed the issue of special laws.
First, thirty years earlier, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
held that an act, subjecting operators of bituminous open-pit coal
mines to conservation measures not required of other miners, was
constitutional." The court concluded that the Legislature could
have rationalized the distinction for this form of mining based on
the greater environmental risks associated with it.96 In a similar
case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld an act that permit-
ted a state agency to limit the granting of loans to the class of
nursing homes that met certain safety standards.97 The court
stated that the legislature could have found that the promotion of
safety standards in the business world was a proper state objec-
tive and the limitation of loan money was rationally related to
that objective.98 Additionally, in another Pennsylvania Supreme
Court case, a tax upon domestic life insurance companies that was
not imposed upon domestic casualty insurance companies was up-
held.99 The court hypothesized that the tax differential could be
based upon the different characters of the two insurances and was
therefore a rational distinction. °° After reviewing these cases, the
court, in Freezer, concluded that once distinctions among a class
are found to be genuine, the reviewing court has no further discre-
tion to examine the Legislature's judgment, notwithstanding the
court's opinion as to the wisdom of the distinction."'
In Harristown Development Corp. v. Dep't of General Services,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether legislation
that created a class with only one member would be struck down
as unconstitutional."°2 Act 153 of 1988 required nonprofit corpora-
tions, which collected rental income over $1,500,000 per year from
the Commonwealth, to meet the requirements of the Sunshine Act
94. Id. at 718.
95. Freezer Storage, 382 A.2d at 719 (citing DuFour v. Maize, 56 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1948)).
96. Id. at 719 (citing DuFour, 56 A.2d at 675).
97. Id. at 719 (citing Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan Agency, 331 A.2d 198 (Pa. 1975)).
98. Id. at 719 (citing Tosto, 331 A.2d at 198).
99. Id. at 719 (citing Commonwealth v. Life Assurance Co., 214 A.2d 209 (Pa. 1965)).
100. Freezer Storage, 382 A.2d at 719 (citing Life Assurance Co., 214 A.2d at 209).
101. Id. at 718, 721.
102. 614 A.2d 1128, 1132 (Pa. 1992).
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and the Right to Know Act."°3 Harristown argued that since they
were the only nonprofit corporation to lease more than $1,500,000
of rental space to the Commonwealth, Act 153 violated Article III,
Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.' The court stated
that "a classification of one member is not unconstitutional so long
as other members might come into that class."05 The majority
held that the appropriate test was "whether there is any rational
basis pursuant to which the classification may have been made."0 6
In analyzing the purported rational basis for a class of one, the
court stated:
Because Harristown is the largest supplier of rented space to
the Commonwealth, and because the viability of state gov-
ernment depends upon assurance that it will continue to be
able to have space for its various departments and agencies,
the Commonweath needs to be able to monitor the soundness
of Harristown's business operations and to avoid impending
difficulty which may threaten Harristown's continued opera-
tion and ability to provide rental space for government opera-
tions. °7
The court acknowledged that Act 153 had been written with Har-
ristown in mind, but it upheld Act 153 because the class was not
closed to other potential members and also because there was a
rational basis for the classification.
08
In DeFazio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Allegheny County, while af-
firming the Commonwealth Court's order for a permanent injunc-
tion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared 16 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 4216, 4217 (hereinafter "Acts") to be in violation of Arti-
cle III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.9 Allegheny
County Sheriff DeFazio had brought the action seeking to enjoin
the county from enforcing the legislation that imposed hiring and
103. Harristown, 614 A.2d at 1129. Originally, the bill was passed to include any non-
profit corporation which leased land, offices, or accommodations to the Commonwealth. Id.
at 1130. After protests from several non-profits, the bill was amended to include only cor-
porations in excess of the $1,500,000 figure. Id. "The Right to Know Law and the Sunshine
Act provide, respectively, that records and meetings of covered agencies shall be open to
citizens of the Commonwealth." Id. The Sunshine Act is codified at 65 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
271-286, and The Right to Know Act is codified at 65 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 66.1-66.4 (2000).
104. Harristown, 614 A.2d at 1131.
105. Id. at 1132 n.9.
106. Id. at 1132.
107. Id. at 1132 n.9.
108. Id. at 1129.
109. 756 A.2d 1103 (Pa. 2000).
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promotion requirements on sheriffs of second class counties and
curtailed political activities of sheriffs employees."0 The Acts sin-
gled out Allegheny County by creating a new sub-classification:
sheriffs of second class counties."' In defense of the legislation,
the Attorney General argued that the second class county and the
unique function of the sheriffs office justified the differential
treatment."' However, the court held that "[p]lainly such a sub-
classification bears no relationship either to the distinction of Al-
legheny County as a county of the second class or any unique func-
tion of the office of county sheriff.""
3
In DeFazio, the court acknowledged that the legislature may
treat different classes of counties differently, but Sections 4216
and 4217 proposed a sub-classification by mandating different
treatment of one particular county officer from another similarly
situated county officer." 4 Additionally, the legislation singled out
the sheriff, as the only county official in Pennsylvania without
some discretion in the hiring, termination, or promotion of his em-
ployees."5 The court stated that "[o]ne particular county officer
110. DeFazio, 756 A.2d at 1104. 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4216 provides in relevant part:
(b) Whenever a vacancy is likely to occur or is to be filled in a permanent position in
the office of sheriff, the sheriff shall submit to the civil service commission a state-
ment indicating the position to be filled. The civil service commission shall there-
upon certify to the sheriff the names of the three eligibles willing to accept appoint-
ment who are highest, according to the results of the written examination, on the ap-
propriate promotion list or employment list, whichever is in existence. If there are
less than three eligibles on appropriate eligible lists who are willing to accept ap-
pointment, the civil service commission shall certify all the names on these lists. If
upon inquiry by the civil service commission, any person on any promotion or em-
ployment list is found to be not available for promotion or appointment, the person's
name shall not for the time being be considered among the names from which a pro-
motion or appointment is to be made.
(c) Appointees shall be selected for each existing vacancy from the eligible list in the
order of names of the three persons thereon who have received the highest average
on the written examination. Examinations shall be administered for positions of the
rank of captain and below and appointments shall be made in the order of names of
the three persons who have received the highest average.
16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4216(a)(b) (1953). 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4217 provides in relevant
part:
(a) No employee shall use his official authority or influence for the purpose of inter-
fering with or affecting the result of an election.
(b) No employee shall take an active part in political management or in a political
campaign.
16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4217(a) (1953).







may not be treated differently from the other officers of that
county unless the difference in treatment bears some reasonable
relationship to some unique characteristic of that particular of-
fice.""6 The Attorney General cited the interaction with the public
and the judicial system as the unique characteristics that war-
ranted differential treatment of the sheriffs office." 7  The court
acknowledged this distinction, but ultimately held that it was "in-
sufficient to justify different treatment from other offices which
have, to varying extents, the same types of interaction, e.g., the
county police, the district attorney, and others who must relate to
both the public and the courts.""8
In 2000, the plaintiffs in Hickok I brought a similar action con-
cerning Act 91's predecessor, Act 16."1 The language of Act 16
limited the potential class of mayoral controlled school districts to
only Harrisburg. 120  Citing DeFazio, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court acknowledged that the prohibition against special laws did
not preclude the General Assembly from classifications "provided
that those classifications are reasonable rather that arbitrary and
bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation."'
However, the court found Act 16 to be unconstitutional because
there was "no rational basis for treating the school district of Har-
risburg differently from other school districts with failed educa-
tional systems."12   The majority applied the test from Freezer
Storage, stating that a classification must be based on real distinc-
tions, not artificial or irrelevant ones developed for the sole pur-
pose of avoiding being categorized as a special law.'23 Additionally,
the court relied on the rule from Harristown, stating that "this
court has held that a classification is per se unconstitutional when
the class consists of one member and it is impossible or highly
unlikely that another can join the class."'24 The public officials
contended that it was plausible that the capital may be moved to
another city; thus, another city would be qualified as a potential
116. DeFazio, 756 A-2d at 1106.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Hickok 1, 761 A-2d at 1132.
120. Id. at 1135. Act 16 provided that "a school district of the second class with a history
of low test performance which is coterminous with the city of the third class which contains
the permanent seat of government" (i.e., Harrisburg). 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 17-1707-B
(2000).
121. Hickok 1, 761 A.2d at 1136 n.2.
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member of the class.2 5 However, the court rejected this argument
on the grounds that Act 16 specified that there was to be only one
capital city in the Commonwealth."'
In Zogby, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court consistently applied
the rules that pertain to Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. A few clearly defined principles have evolved for a
special laws analysis. First, the class must have the potential of
containing more than one member.1 27 In Hickok I, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court refused to uphold the Reed Amendment,
since the only potential class member was the Harrisburg School
District. 28 Again in Zogby, the court has applied the same rule.
129
However, the court reached a different result, upholding Act 91,
because of the potential for several school districts to be listed into
the class, instead of just one.
1 3
1
Second, the classification must be tied to a legitimate state pur-
pose.' This rule requires the classification to be founded on real
distinctions in the subjects classified.32 In Zogby, the court found
several purposes the Legislature could have relied on in the crea-
tion of Act 91.' The court recognized that the Legislature could
have permissibly chosen to limit the program to districts within
cities having a mayor-controlled government." In these cities, the
mayor would be held accountable to the same local electorate that
chose the school board. 3' Also, cities practicing home-rule, mayor-
council governments under Charter Law have an increased level
of local control.'36 Thus, it follows that an education reform plan
that will be controlled locally should first be implemented in cities
with a government already practicing the highest level of local
control. Additionally, a pilot program, or any other program that
addresses state problems on an incremental basis, has never be-
fore been considered biased or special. Clearly, the court found
125. Id.
126. Hickok 1, 761 A.2d at 1136.
127. Id. at 1136.
128. Id.
129. Zogby, 828 A-2d at 1091.
130. Id. at 1086.
131. Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan Agency, 331 A-2d 198, 201-02 (Pa. 1975).
132. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715, 718 (Pa. 1978).






several legitimate reasons of the Legislature for the creation of
Act 91's classification.
3 7
In Zogby, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached a consistent
decision. The court applied principles that have become palpably
defined in the last seventy years of case law. Act 91 created a
class with a potential for several members.13 ' The court upheld
the established rule: a law, creating a class with a potential for
more than one member, will not be considered special, if there is a
rational basis for the classification, and the classification furthers
a legitimate government interest. Following the long line of cases
that have molded the way the Commonwealth approaches Act III,
Section 32's prohibition against special laws, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled in a conventional manner in Zogby.
Heather L. Lamparter
137. Id. at 1091.
138. Zogby, 828 A-2d at 1088.
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